MPKC-based Threshold Proxy Signcryption Scheme

MPKC-based Threshold Proxy Signcryption Scheme

Li Huixian1, Gao Jin1, Wang Lingyun1, and Pang Liaojun2

1School of Computer Science and Engineering, Northwestern Polytechnical University, China

2State Key Laboratory of Integrated Services Networks, Xidian University, China

Abstract: The threshold proxy signcryption can implement signature and encryption simultaneously in one logical step, and can be used to realize the decentralized protection of the group signature key, so it is an efficient technology for network security. Currently, most of the existing threshold proxy signcryption schemes are designed based on the traditional public key cryptosystems, and their security mainly depends on the difficulty of the large integer decomposition and the discrete logarithm. However, the traditional public key cryptosystems cannot resist the quantum computer attack, which makes the existing threshold proxy signcryption schemes based on traditional public key cryptosystems insecure against quantum attacks. Motivated by these concerns, we proposed a threshold proxy signcryption scheme based on Multivariate Public Key Cryptosystem (MPKC) which is one of the quantum attack-resistent public key algorithms. Under the premise of satisfying the threshold signcryption requirements of the threshold proxy, our scheme can not only realize the flexible participation of the proxy signcrypters but also resist the quantum computing attack. Finally, based on the assumption of Multivariate Quadratic (MQ) problem and Isomorphism Polynomial (IP) problem, the proof of the confidentiality and the unforgeability of the proposed scheme under the random oracle model is given.

Keywords: Multivariate public key cryptosystem, signcryption, threshold proxy signcryption, quantum attack.

Received December 5, 2017; accepted May 29, 2019
https://doi.org/10.34028/iajit/17/2/7

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